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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the work to the union. In this situation, the union's demand is not
for preservation of work but for work it never had. Consequently, the
union has no claim that the subcontractor has breached his agree-
ment to give to the union all work preserved by the bargaining
agreement.
CONCLUSION
When work prgeervation agreements are enforced, prefabri-
cated materials are kept off the jobsite. Manufacturers of these
materials are foreclosed from competing in the construction indus-
try. It is the elimination of competition between skilled labor and
manufacturers of prefabricated materials that is the vice of work
preservation agreements. Enforcement of such agreements in
"right-to-control" cases deprives the general contractor of the free-
dom to choose between use of prefabricated materials and employ-
ment of skilled labor. It is this freedom of choice that Enterprise
protects. Work preservation agreements remain valid; the preserva-
tion of bargaining unit work is a primary goal, but neither the agree-
ment nor activities in pursuit of work preservation are protected
when the union seeks to influence by economic pressure the business
decisions of one outside the collective bargaining agreement.
DIANE AUSTIN
Carey, Kids and Contraceptives:
Privacy's Problem Child
In Carey v. Population Services International the Supreme
Court held that a New York state statute restricting access to
nonprescription contraceptives violated the right to privacy of
both adults and minors. In order to include access to contracep-
tives within the protection of the privacy right and maintain
consistency with the constitutionality of state laws prohibiting
adultery, fornication and sodomy, the Court found it necessary
to reformulate the rationale of its decisions in Griswold v. Con-
necticut and subsequent privacy cases. The author of this note
first considers the validity of the Court's new interpretation of
Griswold as creating a right to privacy which protects activities
related to the decision whether or not to bear or beget children.
He then assesses the possible results of applying this newly-
defined privacy right to those private consensual activities tradi-
tionally forbidden by state laws.
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New York Education Law section 6811(8)1 prohibited advertise-
ment of contraceptives and, in conjunction with section 6807(b)2 of
the same law, restricted access to nonprescription contraceptives by
authorizing distribution only by licensed pharmacists to persons
above the age of sixteen and only by licensed physicians to persons
below that age. Population Planning Associates, Inc., (PPA), a
North Carolina firm which advertised nonprescription contracep-
tives in the state of New York and sold them there by mail without
regard to the age of the purchaser, was threatened with prosecution
by New York officials under this law. PPA, along with several other
concerned parties,3 sought declaratory and injunctive relief before
a three-judge United States District Court. The act was declared
unconstitutional as to both the advertising prohibition and access
restrictions.4 On direct appeal,5 the Supreme Court, held, affirmed:
1. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6811(8) (McKinney 1972). The enactment provides:
It shall be a class A misdemeanor for:
8. Any person to sell or distribute any instrument or article, or any recipe, drug
or medicine for the prevention of conception to a minor under the age of sixteen
years; the sale or distribution of such to a person other than a minor under the
age of sixteen years is authorized only by a licensed pharmacist but the advertise-
ment or display of said articles, within or without the premises of such pharmacy,
is hereby prohibited.
2. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6807(b) (McKinney 1972). The enactment provides:
1. This article shall not be construed to affect or prevent:
(b) any physician . . . who is not the owner of a pharmacy, or registered store,
or who is not in the employ of such owner, from supplying his patients with such
drugs as the physician . . . deems proper in connection with his practice ....
Nonprescription contraceptives fall within the definition of "drug" in the statute. Population
Serv. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321, 329 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
3. Population Serv. International, a nonprofit corporation for the dissemination of birth
control information; a minister who directed a venereal disease prevention program; three
New York physicians specializing in obstetrics and family planning; and an adult New York
resident who claimed that the statute restricted his access to contraceptives and his freedom
to distribute them to his children. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 682 n.2
(1977).
4. Population Serv. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321, 336-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
5. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). The Court found that PPA had standing sufficient to satisfy the
article III requirement of a case or controversy because of the imminent threat of prosecution.
The New York State Board of Pharmacy had written two letters to PPA, the first of which
advised them of their violation of the statute under consideration while the second letter
stated that if PPA failed to comply with the statute, the matter would be turned over to the
state attorney for legal action. Id. at 682-83. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459-60
(1974). But see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (statute had not been enforced for over
80 years). Furthermore, the Court found that PPA, as a vendor, could assert the rights of its
potential customers and therefore there was no need to determine the standing of the other
appellees. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (vendor of beer could assert rights of potential
purchasers). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.
249 (1953); Comment, Recent Standing Cases and a Possible Alternative Approach, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 213 (1975).
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The complete advertising ban was violative of appellees' first
amendment right to free speech' and the restrictions on access to
nonprescription contraceptives were violations of fourteenth
amendment due process in breaching the right to privacy of both
adults and minors in their decisions "whether or not to beget or bear
a child." 7
While arousing some interest from the media,' the Carey hold-
ing that blanket prohibitions on nonobscene commercial advertising
are unconstitutionally broad did not appreciably alter or extend the
law in the area of free speech.' The prime importance of Carey is
the manner in which it expands the scope of the right to privacy.
Specifically, the case helped define the indistinct boundaries of the
"privacy zone" established in Griswold v. Connecticut.'0 More im-
portantly, it presents an insight into the Court's future position in
the conflict between this expanding right to privacy and traditional
state laws forbidding private consensual acts of sodomy, fornication
and adultery."
I. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The right to privacy as a distinct legal entity is of rather recent
origin. The concept and the name were first developed in the famous
article 2 by Brandeis and Warren in 1890 where the authors synthes-
ized several separate tort theories of recovery'" into one general
6. 431 U.S. 678, 700 (1977).
7. Id. at 684-85. See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
8. E.g., N.Y. Times, June 10, 1977, § 1, at 15, col. 1; Wash. Post, June 10, 1977, § A,
at 1, col. 1.
9. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976). Because the advertised articles were neither obscene nor likely to incite
unlawful action, and because the information contained in the advertising was concededly
truthful, the complete ban on advertising at issue in Carey was squarely analogous to the
prohibition on opticians' price advertising struck down in Virginia State Bd. 431 U.S. at 700-
01. Additionally, first amendment protection of expressions having nonobscene sexual impli-
cations had already been invoked to allow the publication of a more pointedly offensive
expression. Cohen v. California, 203 U.S. 15 (1969) (wearing in public of jacket bearing a
phrase commanding passersby to commit sexual intercourse with the Selective Service Ad-
ministration). See also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977); Alexander, Speech
in the Local Marketplace: Implications of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., for Local Regulatory Power, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 357
(1977).
10. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11. See notes 44-46 infra and accompanying text.
12. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). See generally
Davis, What Do We Mean by "Right to Privacy"?, 4 S.D.L. REv. 1 (1959); Griswold, The
Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 216 (1960); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383
(1960).
13. The theories relied upon were appropriation of plaintiffs name or likeness, intrusion
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theory called the "right to privacy." As this innovation in tort law
steadily gained acceptance, the concept of privacy as one aspect of
due process cropped up in various constitutional cases." Finally, in
Griswold, the Supreme Court declared a state law prohibiting use
of contraceptives by married persons unconstitutional because it
violated their "right of privacy." The Court determined that this
"right" was lodged in the "penumbras" of the first, third, fourth,
fifth and ninth amendments to the Constitution. The "penumbras,"
or fringe areas, evidently combined synergistically to produce the
distinct right. 5 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, conceived of
the right as creating a zone of privacy within which activities could
not be disturbed without a justified governmental interest. He
found that, due to its intimate and personal nature, marriage was
one of the activities or relationships which would be protected
within the zone. His vision of police searching bedrooms for telltale
upon plaintiff's physical seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, and imposing upon
plaintiff false light in the public eye. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 195-98, 205, 213.
14. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886);
see, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Union Pac. R.R. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250, 251-52 (1891).
15. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-85 (1965) ("We do not sit as a super-
legislature. ... )  But see id. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (marital privacy a fun-
damental right per se lodged in ninth amendment); id. at 502-07 (White, J., concurring)
(marital privacy an aspect of fourteenth amendment due process). Douglas' majority opinion
reflected the then current antipathy for-the theory of substantive due process. This disdain
was best articulated by Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905). The theory as it then existed gave the Court broad power to pass upon
the basic rationality or feasibility of laws, a discretion which Holmes contended was exclusive
to the legislative branch. Unlike the more narrowly structured concepts of procedural and
jurisdictional due process, substantive due process involves a determination of whether the
governmental action is reasonable under the circumstances. In a series of cases culminating
in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), the Court attempted to eliminate the theory.
Justice Black, writing for the Court, stated: "We have returned to the original constitutional
proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment
of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws." Id. at 730.
Barely a decade passed before the Court exhumed the theory and rejuvenated it as the
vehicle for the right to privacy, in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). In Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976) the Court fully revitalized the theory by specifically using the term
"substantive due process" and avoiding any discussion of the penumbra or ninth amendment
theories. One may speculate as to the reason for the Court's rejection of the penumbra theory
as the vehicle for the right to privacy. It may have been the Court's uneasiness with the
seemingly boundless potential of Douglas' innovative penumbra theory which prompted them
to substitute the more familiar, albeit discredited, theory of substantive due process. Carey,
however, has foreclosed the possibility that privacy will be reassimilated completely into the
concept of due process because activities which are not fundamental rights have been ele-
vated to that status as components of the right to privacy. See note 53 infra and accompany-
ing text. See generally Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections On (And Be-
yond) Recent Cases, 72 Nw. U.L. Rav. 417, 420 (1976) (right of privacy a facade for direct
application of substantive 'due process).
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signs of contraceptive use histrionically demonstrated the repulsive
intrusion of the eminently "silly" law."I
After Griswold the Court increased the number of activities to
be included in the zone by adding the use of contraceptives by
unmarried persons 7 and the decisions of adults" and minors" to
receive an abortion. In these cases the Court, through dictum, also
gathered retroactively into the zone several activities and relation-
ships which it had already deemed protected either through equal
protection or by virtue of their inclusion in due process: decisions
related to marriage,20 procreation,2' child education" and family re-
lationships. 3
II. tHE CASE
Carey affirmatively answered the question expressly left open
in Eisenstadt v. Baird4 as to whether access to contraceptives would
be placed within the zone of privacy. Writing for the Court, Justice
Brennan applied the two-tiered analysis of equal protection and
substantive due process 5 in almost textbook fashion. Firstly, he
16. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
17. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), unmarried persons, because of their
equal protection right, were held to be protected by the same zone of privacy enveloping
married persons:
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons can
not be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally
impermissible. It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered
in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity
with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with
a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
Id. at 453.
18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state interest becomes compelling after the end
of the first trimester of pregnancy).
19. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See note 32 infra and accom-
panying text.
20. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
21. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (compulsory sterilization of habitual
criminals struck down on equal protection grounds).
22. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (choice of parochial education for
children protected); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (choice of studying foreign
languages in school protected).
23. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (parental employment of child pro-
tected).
24. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
25. In analyzing whether a discriminatory state action is valid under the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Court has formulated two tests. If the state
action touches a fundamental right (voting, citizenship, free movement, the incorporated
rights of the first eight amendments and now, privacy; see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
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included access to contraceptives within the zone by applying what
he considered to be a new reading of Griswold. This reading capsul-
ized the rationale of the privacy cases from Griswold to the present
as holding that "the decision whether or not to beget or bear a
child" is protected from unjustified government intrusion. He then
assumed that access to contraceptives directly concerns the decision
to beget children and, therefore, warranted inclusion in the zone.
Secondly, Brennan concluded that the overly broad restrictions on
access in the statute substantially frustrated the exercise of the
right to privacy by greatly limiting the availability of contraceptives
on the market. 2 Thirdly, he concluded that the state's interests in
prohibiting youths from selling contraceptives, promoting quality
control in distribution, and facilitating administration of other re-
lated laws were not compelling enough to warrant this substantial
intrusion." Finally, he decided that even if the state could have
shown these interests to be compelling, this statute would not have
subserved them.30 Part IV of the Court's decision, although reflect-
ing the views of only Brennan and three of the justices, is important
insofar as it supplies the reasoning that prompted the Court to
include access to contraceptives within the zone of privacy and indi-
U.S. 618 (1969)) or a "suspect factor" (race, color and status as an alien; see, e.g., Brown v.
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (race and color)) the state, to sustain the validity of the
action, must demonstrate a compelling interest for imposing the discrimination. If the state
action concerns neither a fundamental right nor a suspect factor, the state need only show a
rational basis for the discrimination. City of New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). This
analysis applies to federal action as well, since the equal protection concept has been read
into the fifth amendment. Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). With the resurgence of
fourteenth amendment substantive due process in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the
Court virtually transferred the two-tiered analysis from equal protection into substantive due
process. Id. at 155-57. This analysis has also been applied against federal action involving
fifth amendment substantive due process. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1
(1976). While the rational basis test can be readily overcome by well-considered legislation,
it is important to note that in only a few instances has legislation subject to the compelling
interest test been validated. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (certain Georgia abortion
restrictions subsequent to the end of the first trimester of pregnancy); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Japanese nationals' relocation enactment during World War II);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (Japanese nationals' curfew enactment
during World War II). For a good discussion, although somewhat dated, of the balancing tests
as originating in equal protection, see Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341 (1949).
26. 431 U.S. at 684-85.
27. Id. at 687-88.
28. Id. at 689-90.
29. Id. at 690-91.
30. The Court concluded that frequently minors work in pharmacies where in fact the
statutes allow contraceptives to be sold. Moreover, pharmacists would have no special knowl-
edge as to the quality of the prepackaged contraceptives to effectuate any "quality control"
over the articles. Under no circumstances would the Court recognize "administration of other
laws" as a valid interest in restricting a fundamental right. Id.
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cates the Court's disinclination to address the question of to what
extent states may regulate the moral qualities of their citizens.3'
Brennan reasoned that if adults and minors32 could enjoy a right to
privacy in terminating a pregnancy, it would be illogical to deny
them the right to privacy in preventing it.13
Justice White apprehensively concurred to the extent that the
Court's decision did not disturb state laws prohibiting extramarital
sexual activities. Justice Stevens dwelled upon the counterpro-
ductive effects of the state statutes in his concurring opinion. He
was disturbed by the fact that not only did the statutes not sub-
serve a compelling state interest, but also that they promoted
serious social damage as enforced.35 In his opinion which concurred
in part and concurred in judgment, Justice Powell agreed with the
outcome but disagreed with the rationale used in the majority opin-
31. Id. at 694 n.17. In response to appellees' contention that any state regulation of
private consensual activities is unconstitutional, Brennan stated that the Court had not
definitely answered that "difficult" question and was not passing on it in this case. But see
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g mem. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.
Va. 1975); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 132 n.10 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
also Hughes,- Morals and the Criminal Law, 71 YALE L.J. 662, 672-73 (1962); Note, On
Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 670, 732-38 (1973).
32. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The holding of this decision
struck down, as violative of the right to privacy, parental and spousal consent requirements
for a minor having an abortion. Like Carey, Planned Parenthood dealt with the right to
privacy as it related to both adults and minors. However, the Court in neither case even
partially resolved the present confusion concerning minors' rights. Brennan in Carey called
the question of minors' rights a "vexing problem" for which there is no precise answer. 431
U.S. at 692. The Court seems to be in a quandary as to whether minors should be afforded
only qualified fundamental rights or, correlatively, full scale fundamental rights but with a
lowering of the stringent compelling interest standard. 431 U.S. at 692-96. This uncertainty
is generated by the Court's feeling that the power of the state to control minors reaches
beyond its power to control adults. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). With respect to procedural safeguards, the Court
has granted equal treatment to children. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). A perhaps overly
simplistic method of clearing up this conceptual problem is to grant total equality in funda-
mental rights to minors and then simply use the fact of minority as a naturally important
aspect in assessing the governmental interest. For a discussion of Planned Parenthood, see
Note, Third Party Consent to Abortions Before and After Danforth: A Theoretical Analysis,
15 J. FAM. L. 508 (1976-77). For a discussion of minors' rights incorporating the Carey
decision, see Hafen, Puberty, Privacy, and Protection: The Risk of Childrens' "Rights," 63
A.B.A.J. 1383 (1977).
33. 431 U.S. at 694.
34. Id. at 702.
35. Id. at 712-16. Justice Stevens' analogy is quite apt: trying to discourage sexual
promiscuity among youngsters by prohibiting the use of contraceptives would be as ineffective
and counterproductive as attempting to discourage motorcycle driving by prohibiting the use
of safety helmets. For rather convincing evidence that restricting access to contraceptives
does not deter sexual promiscuity, see, Settlage, Baroff & Cooper, Sexual Experience of




ion. He concluded that Brennan's evaluation of the privacy cases
was unnecessary and would place every consensual sex act by adults
within the zone.36 The Chief Justice dissented without opinion.37
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion melodramatically suggested
that access to contraceptives was not fundamental to a free society
and therefore did not warrant protection within the zone of pri-
vacy."
III. IMPLICATIONS OF CAREY
A review of the abortion decisions and a consideration of the
deleterious effects of the statutes under consideration indicate that
Brennan correctly reasoned that Planned Parenthood virtually
mandated the outcome of Carey."5 The decision to prevent concep-
tion is very likely just as personal and intimate an activity as the
decision to abort. The intriguing aspect of the Carey decision is the
process of reasoning by which the Court included access to contra-
ceptives in the zone of privacy. In the previous privacy cases the
scope of the right grew as the Court considered whether the activi-
ties at issue were so personal, intimate or fundamental as to warrant
inclusion within the zone. If so, the right to privacy was invoked and
the regulating statute was then subjected to the strict compelling
interest test.40 The Carey Court could have confined itself to this
direct extension approach, as the district court had," by merely
finding that access to contraceptives was a highly personal and
intimate activity into which the government could not intrude with-
out a compelling interest. The Court chose to take a more circui-
tuous route, however, by retrospectively formulating the "bear or
beget" rationale to encompass access to contraception within the
36. 431 U.S. at 703-07. Powell's opinion went beyond the issue of minors' rights into
the propriety of governmental'intrusion into the family relationship. Id. at 707-10.
37. Id. at 702.
38. Id. at 717-19.
39. Id. at 694.
40. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("This right to privacy ... Ti broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("[It is the right .. . to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) ("The
present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy .. "). Compare
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) with Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976),
where the Court considered, respectively, confidential information and reputation as irrele-
vant to the concept of privacy.
41. Population Serv. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321, 330-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1975): "ITihis
Court has no doubt that access to contraceptives is an aspect of the right to privacy, that is,
a right encompassed within the personal liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 331.
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right to privacy notion.42 It would appear that by using this metho-
dology the Court could include access to contraceptives in the zone
of privacy without undermining the constitutionality of the state
laws prohibiting private acts of sodomy or homosexuality which the
Court had recently affirmed in the case Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney. 11
As was evidenced by the fears of Justices White and Powell,"
a continuing problem for the Court had been how to allow various
private and intimate activities into the zone of privacy without also
permitting inclusion of certain private consensual activities which
have been prohibited as being morally degenerate: fornication,
adultery, sodomy and homosexuality." With the exception of Jus-
tices Marshall and Stevens, all the members of the Court have
either jointly or individually supported the proposition that the
right to privacy should not extend to these acts even if committed
in the privacy of the home." The only intelligible rationale offered
for this distinction was that privacy protected only fundamental or
traditionally acceptable activities or relationships.47 With only
Griswold on the books, one could easily view the activity protected,
42. 431 U.S. at 687:
These decisions [Eisenstadt, Roe and Whalen] put Griswold in proper perspec-
tive. Griswold may no longer be read as holding only that a State may not prohibit
a married couple's use of contraceptives. Read in light of its progeny, the teaching
of Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of
childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the state.
43. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g mer. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975). The rationale
offered by the lower court in Doe conforms to that mentioned in the text accompanying note
47 infra. See generally Perry, supra note 15, at 436.51; 15 DuQ. L. REv. 213 (1976); 65 Ky.
L.J. 748 (1977).
44. See notes 34 & 36 supra and accompanying text.
45. Fornication is defined as unlawful sexual intercourse other than between a man and
his wife. Adultery is any sexual intercourse between a married person and one to whom he or
she is not married. Sodomy is any carnal copulation committed unnaturally between human
beings. BLACK'S LAW DIcTrONARY 781, 71, 1563 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). As of this writing 22 states
have retained some foim of fornication or lewd cohabitation statute. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 798.03
(1975). Twe'ntCseven states have adultery statutes. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 798.01 (1975). Thirty
states retain sodomy laws. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1975).
46. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g mem. 403 F. Supp.
1199 (E.D. Va. 1975); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 132 n.10 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting: "I have serious doubts whether the State may constitutionally assert an interest
in regulating any sexual act between consenting adults."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 498-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring, joined by Brennan, J.). See generally 431 U.S.
at 702 (White, J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552-53 (Harlan J., dissenting).
47. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961):
The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may be
used and the legal and societal context in which children are born and brought
up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual practices
* which express the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to lawful mar-
riage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that
any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis.
[Vol. 32:667
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marital relations in the home, as at least traditionally acceptable,
if not a fundamental right in and of itself.4 However, when
Eisenstadt extended Griswold's right of privacy to unmarried per-
sons,4" this rationale weakened as it became apparent that the activ-
ities protected by the zone need not be traditionally acceptable. The
long-standing law prohibiting fornication and adultery would pre-
clude considering use of contraceptives by unmarried persons as
fundamental or traditional. It became more apparent when the
Court faced the abortion question that the activity protected within
the zone did not have to be a fundamental right per se. The Court
in Roe v. Wade did not find that the mother had a fundamental
right to abort her developing embryo,5" nor could it find that abor-
tion was a traditionally acceptable activity.5' It was more logical and
in keeping with the historic meaning of the phrase "fundamental
right" to hold that the mother had a fundamental right to privacy
in certain very personal decisions which included the decision to
abort." Finally, in Carey, the Court expressly recognized 3 that the
activities protected within the zone need riot be fundamental rights
per se if they are necessary to the enjoyment of the right to privacy.
It would be a misleading use of terms to assert that access to contra-
ceptives, especially for minors, is either fundamental to a free and
ordered society or a traditionally acceptable activity.
With the breakdown of the rationale that only fundamental
rights are protected within the zone of privacy, an unqualified ex-
tension of the zone to include access to contraceptives would have
removed any impediment to the inclusion of the "illicit" sexual
activities mentioned above. Surely a consensual act of fornication
or sodomy between adults in the privacy of the home is as intimate,
personal and expectant of privacy as a youth's journey to the drug
store counter to purchase a package of prophylactics. However, by
48. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-89 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).'
Justice Goldberg looked directly to the marriage relationship as a fundamental right in and
of itself, constitutionally derived through the ninth amendment. This would make super-
fluous the concept of a zone of privacy since, as discussed in note 25 supra, fundamental rights
trigger the compelling interest test without any aid from the right to privacy. This fact points
up the unique and troublesome characteristic of the right to privacy as set forth in Griswold:
nonfundamental activities are elevated to the status of fundamental rights.
49. See note 17 supra.
50. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
51. Id. at 138-140.
52. Id. at 153.
53. 431 U.S. at 688-89:
This is not so because there is an independent fundamental "right of access
to contraceptives," but because such access is essential to exercise of the constitu-
tionally protected right of decision in matters of childbearing that is the underly-
ing foundation of the holdings in Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe v. Wade.
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taking the longer route of crystallizing the rationale of the Griswold
cases in terms of "the decision whether or not to beget or bear a
child,"54 the Court could include access to contraceptives within the
zone without undercutting their affirmance of the laws prohibiting
sodomy. The "decision to beget" language has no meaning in the
context of sodomy or homosexual acts. Only with the greatest
stretch of the imagination could one conclude that the sodomitic act
is a necessary aspect of the decision to beget, especially where homo-
sexuals are involved. Fornication and adultery, on the other hand,
are acts which may result from certain decisions whether or not to
bear or beget children and because of this relevance, the bear or
beget language could serve to include acts of fornication and adul-
tery within the zone.55 Notwithstanding Brennan's assertions to the
contrary, " it seems Justice Powell's fears that Carey will place every
adult sex act within the zone of privacy57 are well-founded to the
extent that the act involves heterosexual intercourse; however,
Carey has left Doe and its support of sodomy laws relatively secure
behind the "bear or beget" language.
IV. COMMENT
In considering the possibility that the "bear or beget" language
could be used effectively to include acts of fornication or adultery
within the zone of privacy, Carey may seem to expand the scope of
the right to privacy well beyond the facts of the privacy cases. Nev-
ertheless, the Carey Court's reading of Griswold to the exclusion of
homosexual acts and relationships in the privacy of the home pre-
sents a distorted definition of the word "privacy." A fairer reading
of Griswold would not include the criterion of procreative concern
injected by Carey.5" Often overlooked is Griswold's assertion that
marriage was just one relationship which would be included within
the zone of privacy. 9 Additionally, the only elements of privacy in
54. 431 U.S. at 684-85.
55. One may surmise that the fornication and adultery laws will be able to pass the
compelling interest test because of the substantially greater governmental interest inherent
in each. See 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 231, 235 n.18, 236 (1968).
56. See note 31 supra.
57.. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
58. See Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1968); Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 638,
639-40 (1974); Comment, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection For Personal Liberty, 48
N.Y.U.L. REV. 670, 733 (1973).
59. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965): "The present case, then, con-
cerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy . . . ." (emphasis added). Id. at 485;
Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right to Privacy, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 979, 982.
"[H]e [Justice Douglas] is in effect saying that the Constitution lays down a wider, more
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Griswold which were determinative of inclusion within the zone
were intimacy, consensuality and autonomy in one's person and
homelife. 0 While Douglas extolled the nobility of marriage, this
aspect was not dispositive. Any doubts as to this were dispelled by
Eisenstadt's extension of privacy to unmarried persons.' Nowhere
in Griswold or in Eisenstadt is there the requirement of procreative
concern. Yet the Carey Court posits the decision to bear or beget as
the "underlying foundation of the holdings in Griswold, Eisenstadt
v. Baird, and Roe v. Wade. ""2 When reconciled with the Court's
affirmance of the sodomy laws in Doe, this narrow view of the right
to privacy in Carey presents some paradoxes in the use of the word
"privacy." Although the youngster remains protected by the right
to privacy while window shopping for condoms, the homosexual
committing a consensual act of sodomy with another adult in the
bedroom of his home is beyond the protection of the right. Evidently
the vision of police searching bedrooms in private homes for telltale
signs of sexual activity somehow becomes repulsive only when the
participants are doing something relevant to child bearing. The
artificiality of the "decision whether or not to beget or bear a
child'"'83 becomes even more apparent when one surmises that in
Carey the minor's only concern is to have worry-free sex. Yet, in
view of the Court's outlook in Carey, it may be more appropriate to
rename this area "the right to pregnancy."
V. CONCLUSION
Although the narrow holding of Carey is that the New York
statute is unconstitutional because it breaches the appellees' right
to privacy without the support of a compelling interest, the great
general guarantee of privacy, within which specific claims may appropriately claim and
deserve recognition." Id. at 982.
60. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (right of privacy
encompasses: caring for one's health and person; freedom to walk, stroll, and loaf); Lovisi v.
Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 355 (4th Cir.) (Craven, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977
(1976). See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (E.D. Va. 1975)
(Merhige, J., dissenting), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976); cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564 (1969) (possession of obscene material at home protected by first amendment, al-
though privacy questions were posed); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. Rv.
1410, 1429 (1974) (attempt to define right of privacy without regard for element of consensual-
ity). But see 431 U.S. at 688-89 (decisions in matters of childbearing as the underlying
foundation of privacy cases); cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497-99 (1965) (Gold-
berg, J., concurring) (only fundamental rights ought be protected). See generally Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., describing the privacy cases as "defying
categorization").
61. See note 17 supra.
62. 431 U.S. at 688-89. See note 53 supra.
63. 431 U.S. at 684-85.
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dependence placed by the Court on the "bear or beget" rationale
may not be easily discounted when the Court finally hears a chal-
lenge to the adultery, fornication and sodomy laws. For the reasons
stated above, the "bear or beget" language of Carey may be quite
incongruously used as support by those attacking the fornication
and adultery laws and also by those supporting the sodomy and
homosexuality laws.
For all the anomaly, however, one ought not condemn the Court
for contorting logic in its effort to reflect the often capricious values
of society.'" Well-entrenched public policies are often not amenable
to consistently logical analysis. On the other hand, it must be re-
membered that the right to privacy is the Court's own adolescent
child. The Court conceived, begat and shaped it as a new constitu-
tional force. So now, if the Court has great difficulty in making it
behave rationally, it can look only to its own lack of foresight.
RICHARD E. WARNER
64. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) (Cardozo, J.,: "The
logical consistency of a juridical conception will indeed be sacrificed at times, when the
sacrifice is essential to the end that some accepted public policy may be defended or up-
held.").
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